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Chapter 6

Engendering Genocide: The Akayesu Case
Before the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda
Beth Van Schaack *

Introduction
Gender crimes and crimes of sexual violence are no longer as invisible as they
once were thanks largely to the work of feminist scholars, practitioners, and activists, and
to the landmark case against John Paul Akayesu before the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR” or Tribunal). The case against Akayesu is credited with
establishing many “firsts” in international criminal law. For one, it resulted in the first
adversarial conviction for genocide under international law since that crime’s inception
fifty years prior. It also established a number of important jurisprudential precedents
concerning the law of incitement, complicity, cumulative charging, individual criminal
responsibility in non-international armed conflicts, and the constitutive elements of the
crime of genocide. Most importantly for the purposes of this volume, the case was the
first to recognize the concept of genocidal rape—the subject of vigorous discussion and
advocacy among the feminist legal and activist community at the time.
Akayesu was bourgmestre (mayor) of Taba Commune and one of its most
powerful people in April 1994 when genocide engulfed the small mountainous country of
Rwanda. The primary allegations against Akayesu were not that he personally engaged
in acts of violence. Rather, he was charged with ordering, inciting, or instigating
international crimes. As one witness described it, “Akayesu did not kill with his own
hands, but with his orders.” 1
During the course of the proceedings against Akayesu, advocates for gender
justice in Rwanda and elsewhere intervened to urge that Akayesu be held responsible for
the rapes perpetrated in Taba Commune and that these acts be recognized as predicate
*

The author is indebted to Timothy Kennedy, Jessica Tillson, and Pami Vyas for their expert research
assistance. In addition, the author would like to thank Susan Lamb and Aritha Wickramasinghe of the
ICTR for their assistance in gathering original materials and transcripts; Rhonda Copelon and Isabelle
Solon Helal for sharing their thoughts, files and memories; and Michelle Oberman, Susana SáCouto, and
Patricia Viseur-Sellers for their generous and helpful comments.
1
Press Release, Fondation Hirondelle, Akayesu Found Guilty of Genocide (Sept. 2, 1998), available at
http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd48f5826c12564cf004f793d/f12757ecc6d866d1c125667
30041e5ae?OpenDocument.
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acts for the genocide charge. This outcome would not have been reached had the original
indictment against Akayesu not been amended in crucial ways, enabling the Tribunal to
rule on the genocidal rape allegations. This story will highlight the role that advocates
played in encouraging the Tribunal to consider genocidal rape in Rwanda and the
limitations such advocates have faced in piercing the prosecutorial and adjudicative
process.
For its rulings on rape and genocide, Akayesu has been heralded as “the most
important decision rendered thus far in the history of women’s jurisprudence.” 2 Given
subsequent developments before the Rwanda tribunal, however, Akayesu’s gender justice
legacy—at least vis-à-vis victims in Rwanda—is more modest. The full story of the
impact of the case must await the work of the International Criminal Court. At this point,
however, there is no doubt that the case ratcheted up the expectations and aspirations of
advocates for international gender justice.
History of the Rwandan Conflict
A brief history of Rwanda is necessary to understand the 1994 genocide. 3
Anthropologists and historians recount that the people of Rwanda (and Burundi)
descended from three distinct populations: one known as the Hutu, who resembled the
Bantu people of the region; a second, the Tutsi, who resembled the Cushitic or Nilotic
people of the Horn of Africa; and a third, the Twa, related to local pigmy populations.
Over time, these groups intermixed and developed a common language and culture. The
groups were differentiated by occupation, economic means, and political status and were
more fluid than fixed.
During the colonial era, from approximately 1890 to 1962, Belgian colonial
administrators solidified these distinctions by “assigning” individuals an “ethnicity” on a
state-issued identity card. The Hutu represented about eighty-four percent of the
population, the Tutsi constituted about fifteen percent, and the Twa about one percent.
At first, the colonizers favored individuals identified as Tutsi—for reasons grounded in
racism, some have argued, as such individuals had more Caucasian features. As a
nascent independence ethos began to develop among the Tutsi elite in the 1940s, the
Belgian colonizers shifted their allegiance to the Hutu populace in an effort to prolong
their rule over the region. This coincided with the Catholic Church’s promotion of a
political awareness among the Hutu populace. Hutu intellectuals soon published
revolutionary manifestos outlining the political, social, and economic oppression suffered
by the Hutu populace at the hands of the minority Tutsi group. In 1956, the U.N.
Trusteeship Council pressured Belgium to organize elections on the basis of universal
2

Kelly Askin, Women’s Issues in International Criminal Law: Recent Developments and the Potential
Contribution of the ICC, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 47, 52 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
3
This historical account is drawn from the factual findings in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4T, Judgment, at paras. 54, 78-129 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter “Akayesu”]. See generally ELIZABETH
NEUFFER, THE KEY TO MY NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND RWANDA (2001); PHILIP
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES:
STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998).
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suffrage. These elections elevated Hutu individuals for the first time into local and
national positions of political power. Rwanda achieved its independence in 1962 under
the leadership of the Belgium-installed Grégoire Kayibanda, a Hutu leader who imposed
ethnically-based quotas for access to schools, some industries, and the civil service that
significantly limited Tutsi participation in these sectors.
More systematic violence began to break out between the two groups in the wake
of these policies and the inequities they generated. 4 Many Tutsi individuals fled to
neighboring countries, especially Uganda, Burundi, and Congo. Some of these exiles
organized themselves into militia to carry out cross-border raids at night, embracing what
later became the epithet Inyenzi, meaning “cockroach.” These raids provoked violent
reprisals against Tutsis within Rwanda. Tutsi exiles in Uganda further organized
themselves into the Rwandese Patriotic Front (“RPF”), with the Rwandan Patriotic Army
(“RPA”) as its military wing. Their goals were the return of exiles to Rwanda and
eventually the overthrow of the Hutu-dominated regime, later led by President
Kayibanda’s successor, General Juvénal Habyarimana, who took power in a coup on July
5, 1973. Habyarimana at first installed a one-party state with automatic national
membership in his Mouvement Républicain National Pour La Démocratie et le
Développement (the National Revolutionary Movement for Democracy and
Development, or MRND). Habyarimana eventually capitulated to internal and external
pressure to allow multipartyism. This opened the way for the rise of Hutu-power
political groups, such as the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (“CDR”).
The RPF launched a devastating attack in October 1990, further destabilizing
Habyarimana’s regime. Hutu-power political parties began to form and train paramilitary
units, such as the MRND’s Interahamwe (“those who stand together”) and the CDR’s
Impuzamugambi (“those who share a single goal”). Together, the groups stepped up antiTutsi violence and propaganda, particularly through the Hutu-dominated Radio
Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (“RTLM”) and a pictorial magazine, Kangura
(“Wake Up”). After several failed ceasefires, the RPF and the Government of Rwanda
agreed to the Arusha Peace Accords on August 4, 1993, providing for the establishment
of a transitional government to include the RPF, the partial demobilization and
integration of the two opposing armies, the creation of a demilitarized zone, and the
deployment of a two-year U.N. peace-keeping force composed of 2,500 soldiers (the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (“UNAMIR”)) to help implement the
Accords.
As President Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira were
returning on April 6, 1994 from a meeting in Tanzania on the implementation of the
Arusha Peace Accords, their plane was shot down over Kigali Airport. The identity and
the precise motive of the assassins remain unknown. Many speculate that Hutu
nationalists, angered that President Habyarimana had capitulated during the peace
process, were responsible.
4

This account belies the tendency of some to describe the killing in Rwanda as an expression of so-called
“age-old tribal animosities.” This facile explanation masks the role that political elites played in
manipulating differences to consolidate political power.
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Radios immediately proclaimed the end of the last ceasefire and government
agents set up roadblocks around the country. Massacres of Tutsi and moderate Hutu
individuals began in Kigali and soon spread to other parts of the country. Fueled by
genocidal propaganda broadcast over the radio and facilitated by the ubiquitous identity
cards, many Hutu citizens turned against their Tutsi friends, neighbors, and compatriots.
Even children were not spared. By the end of April, corpses clogged rivers and streams
and lay in heaps around the country. Because ammunition was eventually in short
supply, many deaths were accomplished with machetes and other rudimentary farm
implements. Eventually, 500,000-800,000 individuals were left dead, almost seventyfive percent of the Tutsi population. 5
In the face of this bloodshed, the international community remained largely silent.
In January 1994—several months before the genocide began—Major-General Roméo
Dallaire, the Canadian force commander of UNAMIR, had learned from a high-level
informant that the extermination of the Tutsi populace was being planned. Dallaire made
several requests to expand his mandate, but in fact, the opposite ensued. On April 7,
1994, the Rwandan Army executed ten Belgian peacekeepers (so called “blue helmets”),
apparently in order to provoke Belgium’s withdrawal. Belgium complied and recalled
the rest of its troops on April 19. On April 21, the U.N. Security Council reduced
UNAMIR’s force size to a few hundred individuals. The international community
employed a series of semantic contortions to avoid using the term “genocide,” afraid that
the Genocide Convention would require states parties to intervene. Six weeks after the
genocide began, the U.S. State Department finally permitted the use of the term.
In 1993, the Security Council had established an ad hoc international tribunal to
prosecute individuals accused of committing international crimes in the ongoing war in
the former Yugoslavia—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”). Responding to calls that Africans deserved international justice too, especially
in the face of atrocities committed on an exponential scale, the Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 6 with jurisdiction
over genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes. Before the Tribunal,
rape—like crimes such as murder, torture, or arbitrary detention—was not prosecutable
as a freestanding crime; rather, it could only be charged as a crime against humanity or a
war crime. Nor was rape an enumerated predicate of genocide, although the actus reus of
the latter crime was broadly defined.
As originally designed, the two ad hoc tribunals shared a Chief Prosecutor and an
Appeals Chamber. The first Chief Prosecutor was Justice Richard Goldstone, a jurist
5

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE TALE: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-04.htm (citing various estimates of the number of
deaths).
6
Through this Resolution, the Security Council expressed the finding that widespread violations of
international law within the territory of Rwanda constituted a threat to international peace and security
justifying intervention under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. It also concluded that establishing an
international criminal tribunal to prosecute individuals responsible for international crimes in Rwanda
would “contribute to the process of national reconciliation and the restoration and maintenance of peace.”
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with a long history fighting human rights abuses in Africa. Below the Chief Prosecutor,
separate prosecutorial offices and deputy prosecutors staffed the two institutions. At the
moment, the two tribunals are subject to Security Council-ratified Completion Strategies
that envision all trial proceedings completed by the end of 2008 and all appellate
proceedings completed in 2010. In the context of establishing these Completion
Strategies, the Security Council appointed a Chief Prosecutor dedicated to the ICTR.
Jean Paul Akayesu
Akayesu had been appointed bourgmestre in April 1993 of Taba Commune,
located a mere 11 miles from the capital of Kigali, amid rolling hills of banana and coffee
fields. As bourgmestre, Akayesu was responsible for maintaining public order and
exercised exclusive control over the local commune police and some authority over any
gendarmes (members of the national police force) dispatched to the area. 7 Although he
originally resisted the unfolding genocide in his region, Akayesu apparently later realized
his political fortunes required him to join the fray, and he changed course. 8 The evidence
established at trial that Akayesu presided over a meeting in which he urged the local
population to eliminate accomplices of the rebel RPF, which—according to the
indictment—“was understood by those present to mean Tutsis,” and named three
prominent Tutsi individuals to be killed. Akayesu also traveled throughout his region
ordering particular “accomplices of the RPF” to be abused or killed, and he permitted
numerous acts of violence to occur in his presence. The Prosecutor alleged that, all told,
at least 2,000 murders took place in Taba Commune and that Akayesu did nothing to
prevent them or punish the perpetrators. 9
Akayesu had not originally been on the ICTR’s radar until his name appeared on a
list of individuals the government of Rwanda was seeking. When Akayesu surfaced in
1995, Goldstone hastily indicted him for his role in inciting and enabling violence against
Tutsi individuals in his commune. In particular, Goldstone charged Akayesu with direct
responsibility for genocide, complicity in genocide, incitement to genocide, crimes
against humanity (extermination and murder), and war crimes (murder).
The Tribunal determined that Akayesu was indigent—despite the fact that he had
been one of the most prominent figures in his community—and so counsel was appointed
for him at the Tribunal’s expense. The prosecution team included Yacob Haile-Mariam
(Ethiopia), Pierre-Richard Prosper (United States), Mohamed Chande Othman
(Tanzania), and others. During the course of the trial, jurist Louise Arbour (Canada)
succeeded Justice Goldstone as the Chief Prosecutor for both the ICTR and the ICTY.
The Trial
7

As the Trial Chamber noted, Akayesu “was in charge of the total life of the commune in terms of the
economy, infrastructure, markets, medical care and the overall social life. . . . The bourgmestre was . . .
commonly treated with great respect and deference by the population.” Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
at para. 54.
8
Id. at paras. 187-193.
9
Id. at para. 12.
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Akayesu’s trial commenced on January 9, 1997 before Trial Chamber I of the
ICTR composed of Judge Laïty Kama (Senegal), presiding alongside Judge Lennart
Aspegren (Sweden) and Judge Navanethem Pillay (South Africa). At the time, Judge
Pillay was the only female judge on the Tribunal. After a number of witnesses testified to
violence against the Tutsi population in Taba Commune, Witness J 10 was called to the
stand on January 27, 1997. A resident of Taba Commune, J was six months pregnant
when the genocide erupted. Most members of her family were killed by a group of
militia who came to their home. J and her six year old daughter managed to escape this
fate by hiding in a tree and scavenging for food. In response to questioning from a
prosecutor, J mentioned, in an almost offhand way, that her six-year-old daughter had
been raped. 11 J confirmed that she had never been questioned about this by any
investigators of the Tribunal. The President of the Tribunal and then Judge Aspergen

10

Pursuant to Article 21 of the ICTR Statute and Rule 75 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”),
the Prosecutor in the Akayesu case requested, as a protective measure, that witness identities not be
disclosed to the public. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Motion on Behalf of Prosecutors for Orders for
Protective Measures for Witnesses to Crimes Alleged in Counts 1 Through 12 of the Indictment (Aug. 16,
1996). In connection with the motion, the Prosecutor submitted a Declaration of Ian Martin, the Chief of
Mission for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda
(HRFOR), which detailed attacks on survivors of and witnesses to the 1994 genocide. Virtually all
eyewitnesses called on behalf of either party received protective measures.
11
J testified as follows on direct examination and in response to questions from the bench:
BY MR. HAILE-MARIAM: . . .
A. After that I went to Kabgaye.
Q. Did anybody go with you?
A. I was with my daughter, who had been raped.
Q. When was she raped?
A. They raped her when they had come to kill my father.
Q. How many men did rape your daughter?
A. Three men.
Q. Was this question ever put to you by the investigators of the Tribunal?
A. No, they did not ask me this question. . . .
Q. I would like to ask you one question, which I skipped when I was asking concerning the rape
of your daughter. How old was your daughter?
A. She was six years old.
Q. I don’t have any more questions, Mr. President. Thank you.
MR. PRESIDENT: Your daughter was raped by three men you say? Do you know these three
men or some of the three men?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I know them.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript, at pp. 00101-00102 (Jan. 27, 1997).
Later, a different judge returned to the topic:
JUSTICE ASPEGREN: To your knowledge were there any other incidents of rape in Taba?
THE WITNESS: I heard it said that there were young girls who were at the bureau communal
[the office of the commune] who were raped. I heard that, but I did not see it.
JUSTICE ASPEGREN: Thank you very much, Madame.
Id. at p. 00137.
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returned to this line of questioning, and J testified further that she had heard that other
girls had been raped in Akayesu’s bureau communal, but she had not seen it herself.
In March 1997, Witness H—the last of the Prosecution’s witnesses—was called
to the stand. H testified that her house had been attacked as well and her family had fled
into nearby bushes. Eventually she was discovered, raped, and abandoned. Her father
found her and brought her to the bureau communal where he had heard people were
taking refuge. By her account, most of the people there were women and children;
members of the communal police and Interahamwe were also present with weapons, but
did nothing to stop the violence. H testified that Akayesu was present while these abuses
were occurring.
On cross examination, the defense did not take up the issue of the rapes, but
Judges Pillay and then Aspergan did, asking H to elaborate upon where Akayesu was and
what he was doing while women were being raped at or near the bureau communal.
Accounts of this trial credit Judge Pillay with bringing the issue of sexual violence in
Taba Commune to the attention of the prosecution. 12 The transcript reveals, however,
that all members of the bench pursued this line of questioning in the face of virtual
silence from the parties. 13 The transcript also suggests that the key testimony emerged
somewhat randomly. If J had not offered the fact that her six-year-old daughter had been
raped, the existence of sexual violence in Taba Commune may never have made it into
the formal record. In addition, it is noteworthy how few details were solicited from the
witnesses, almost as if no one wanted to touch the material or failed to immediately
recognize its significance. That said, prosecutors working on the case had apparently
been aware of the existence of sexual violence in Taba, through the testimony of witness
H and others, but had been unable to link it to the accused sufficiently as required by
principles of individual criminal responsibility. 14
12

See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into
International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL L.J. 217, 225 (2000).
13
This is not the only case in which the judges intervened to raise the issue of gender violence. In the
Decision confirming the Prosecutor v. Nikolić Indictment, the ICTY Trial Chamber exhorted the
Prosecutor to include gender crimes in the Indictment:
It appears that women and girls were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual assault during
their detention . . . Dragan Nikolić and other persons connected with the camp are related to have
been directly involved in some of those rapes and sexual assaults. These allegations do not seem
to relate solely to isolated incidents. The Trial Chamber feels that the prosecutor may be well
advised to review these statements carefully with a view to ascertaining whether to charge Dragan
Nikolić with rapes and other forms of sexual assault, either as a crime against humanity or as
grave breach or war crimes.
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, at para. 33 (Oct. 20, 1995). The Prosecutor did amend the indictment
several years later to include rape charges. Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-01-46-I, First Amended
Indictment, at paras. 44-59 (Feb. 12, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/nik1ai990212e.htm.
14
Email from Patricia Viseur-Sellers to author (February 2, 2008) (on file with author). Viseur-Sellers
indicated that various amended indictments were drafted during April and May, but that these remained
confidential at the time. Other accounts suggest that the Prosecutor’s office in The Hague was supportive
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At the close of H’s testimony, trial was adjourned until May 12, 1997. Trial
observers brought the testimony of J and H to the attention of women’s groups active in
Rwanda and elsewhere. At this time, the issue of gender justice had been on the agenda
of many human rights organizations. Accounts of rape in Rwanda had appeared in the
press and elsewhere. Human Rights Watch, for example, issued a comprehensive report
in 1996 on sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide that drew in part on interviews
with women in Taba Commune. 15 The report called upon the ICTR to fully and fairly
investigate and prosecute acts of sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide, where appropriate; integrate a gender perspective into investigations by,
among other things, hiring more women investigators; treat sex crimes against women
with the same gravity as other crimes; amend existing indictments to ensure that sexual
violence charges were brought, where appropriate; and strengthen and expand the
Witness Protection Unit to protect witnesses and prepare them for testifying. Mobilizing
around these concerns, feminist activists formed a non-governmental organization
(“NGO”), the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations (“Coalition”),
in 1996 specifically to monitor the ICTR and ensure that it protected the rights and
interests of women appearing before the Tribunal. 16
In light of J and H’s testimony, the Coalition 17 submitted an amicus curiae brief 18
(“Coalition Brief”) on behalf of over forty other NGOs and law clinics to the ICTR on
May 27, 1997. 19 The Coalition Brief called upon the Trial Chamber to exercise its
of pursuing these investigations, but that the office in Kigali, Rwanda was pursuing rape investigations less
earnestly, due to lack of expertise, interest, or resolve. At the time, genocide was largely considered to be
the equivalent of mass and discriminatory killings, and so prosecutors may have overlooked the potential
for acts of sexual violence to serve as predicate acts for genocide. This does not explain, however, why
these acts were not charged as crimes against humanity. Email from Rhonda Copelon to author (June 18,
2008) (on file with author).
15
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND
ITS AFTERMATH (1996) [hereinafter “HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES”], available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm.
16
The Coalition continues to promote the prosecution of perpetrators of gender violence in transitional
justice systems based in Africa in order to create precedents that recognize violence against women in
conflict situations and to obtain justice for women survivors of sexual violence.
See
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/main_en.php.
17
The brief was not the Coalition’s first communication with the Tribunal over the dearth of indictments
addressing gender violence in Rwanda. On August 7, 1996, the Coalition wrote to then Chief Prosecutor
Richard Goldstone urging him to include gender crimes in his Rwandan indictments and to undertake a
number of reforms to ensure that such crimes were fully and effectively investigated. Letter from Coalition
for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations to Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone (Aug. 7, 1996)
(on file with the author).
18
Amicus Brief Respecting Amendment of the Indictment and Supplementation of the Evidence to Ensure
the Prosecution of Rape and Other Sexual Violence within the Competence of the Tribunal, Coalition for
Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/
adv-ocacyDossiers/rwanda/Akayesu/amicusbrief_en.php [hereinafter “Coalition Brief”].
19
The Brief is not part of the official online record of the case, for reasons that are not entirely clear. The
speculation is that there were procedural errors in its filing, perhaps because the Coalition did not seek
leave of the Tribunal to appear as amicus in advance of its submission (the brief itself includes a prefatory
motion under Rule 74). In any case, it is not clear if leave was strictly necessary; an ICTY document
entitled “Information Concerning the Submission of Amicus Curiae Briefs” (IT/122), dated March 27,
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inherent supervisory authority to invite the Prosecutor to amend the indictment against
Akayesu to charge rape and other serious acts of sexual violence. It also urged the Trial
Chamber to expand the investigation to inquire into the prevalence of sexual violence in
Rwanda, and to examine why none of the indictments issued up until that point had
included charges of rape or sexual assault, despite the existence of probative evidence in
the record, 20 and in the public domain, supporting such charges. The Coalition Brief
argued further that the Tribunal, in the civil law tradition, had the authority to issue
orders as necessary for the purposes of investigation, the conduct of the trial, and the
production of additional evidence or the summons of witnesses. Without an amendment
to the indictment, the Coalition Brief argued, Akayesu would be granted immunity for
rapes committed within his commune, the women of Taba would be denied justice, and
the Tribunal would send a message that sexual violence is not as serious as other forms of
assault. The Coalition Brief argued that the indictment should be amended to charge rape
and sexual mutilation as crimes against humanity (torture, rape, and persecution on
political, racial or religious grounds) and war crimes (violence to life, health and physical
or mental well-being; outrages upon human dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, and any form of indecent assault; and threats to commit same).
The Coalition Brief also suggested that the Prosecutor consider charging rape as
genocide, arguing that rape and sexual violence were an integral and pervasive part of the
Hutu genocidal campaign designed “to destroy a woman from a physical, mental or social
perspective and [to destroy] her capacity to participate in the reproduction and production
of the community.” 21
On June 17, 1997, the Prosecution sought a hearing before the Trial Chamber.
During this hearing, Prosper and his co-counsel, Sara Darehshori (United States), made
1997, indicated that “amicus briefs may be submitted unsolicited or in response to a general invitation from
a Trial Chamber.” A subsequent letter from the President of the ICTR to the Coalition acknowledged
receipt of the Brief and indicated that it was placed in the official case file and served on all parties. See
Letter from Laïty Kama to Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations (June 4, 1998) (on
file with the author). The Coalition also received letters from the Registrar and the Office of the Prosecutor
acknowledging receipt. Indeed, on July 7, 1997, after the indictment had been amended, the Coalition
received a letter inviting its members to seek leave to present arguments concerning the Brief. The
Coalition declined, as the indictment had already been amended. Email from Rhonda Copelon to author
(June 18, 2008) (on file with author). The Judgment refers to the Coalition Brief in this passage:
The Chamber notes that the Defence in its closing statement questioned whether the Indictment
was amended in response to public pressure concerning the prosecution of sexual violence. The
Chamber understands that the amendment of the Indictment resulted from the spontaneous
testimony of sexual violence by Witness J and Witness H during the course of this trial and the
subsequent investigation of the Prosecution, rather than from public pressure. Nevertheless, the
Chamber takes note of the interest shown in this issue by non-governmental organizations, which
it considers as indicative of public concern over the historical exclusion of rape and other forms of
sexual violence from the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. The investigation and
presentation of evidence relating to sexual violence is in the interest of justice.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at para. 417.
20
At the time the brief was filed, amici were unable to obtain a full transcript of the trial because it was not
yet publicly available. They were, thus, relying upon unofficial public reports of the trial.
21
Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at para. 19.
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an oral motion to amend the indictment in light of the testimony about sexual violence
that had emerged during the trial. Prosper argued that he had been aware of the acts of
rape and sexual violence in Taba Commune, but had been unable to connect these crimes
to the defendant until hearing the testimony of J and H. He explained:
I think it’s safe to say that the issue of sexual violence is of great importance to
the Office of the Prosecutor and we take this issue very, very seriously. We feel
that sexual violence being used as a weapon or as a tool is deplorable and cannot
be accepted. In this case it is clear throughout the testimony that there had been
hints that there were acts of sexual violence occurring in the Taba Commune. It
came up not only in the testimony of Witness J or Witness H but I have to say it
also came up in prior investigations, but the … information we received before, in
our opinion, was not enough to link the accused to the acts of sexual violence.
We continued to look into it. … After receiving [additional witness statements],
we as the Office of the Prosecutor feel that we are duty bound to come here today
and make this request…. 22
Addressing the absence of allegations concerning sexual violence in the first indictment,
Prosper explained: “Maybe because the shame that sometimes accompanies these acts
prevented the women from testifying or declaring what occurred to them or also I’m
ready to admit, maybe sometimes we were not as sensitive as we should have been on the
issue.” 23 He denied that the Prosecution was motivated by the Coalition Brief. “I would
like to say to this Chamber right now and make it perfectly clear that the amicus curiae is
not motivating us today. It is not motivating us today and, in fact, it can only be
considered as a factor. And I say this as a factor because what it does is it reminds us of
the importance of the issue of sexual violence.” 24 The proescution proposed to amend
the indictment to charge the crime against humanity of rape, the crime against humanity
of inhumane acts, and the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity, including rape
and indecent assault, under Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. 25 Prosper did
not propose to amend the genocide counts to specifically include reference to sexual
violence as predicate acts of genocide. Not surprisingly, Akayesu’s counsel opposed the
proposed amendments, arguing that the timing was improvident and that the defense had
been given no time to consider the supporting materials, having been provided copies of
witness statements—most of which were dated June 12, 1997—over the preceding
weekend and an English translation of the proposed Amended Indictment that morning.
After deliberating for ten minutes, the Chamber granted leave to amend and
postponed the trial until October 22, 1997. The following three paragraphs concerned
with sexual violence in Taba were then added to the amended indictment:

22

Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript, at p. 6 (June 17, 1997).
Id. at 7.
24
Id. at 8.
25
Id. at 18.
23
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10A. In this indictment, acts of sexual violence include forcible sexual
penetration of the vagina, anus or oral cavity by a penis and/or of the vagina or
anus by some other object, and sexual abuse, such as forced nudity. . . .
12A. Between April 7 and the end of June, 1994, hundreds of civilians
(hereinafter “displaced civilians”) sought refuge at the bureau communal. The
majority of these displaced civilians were Tutsi. While seeking refuge at the
bureau communal, female displaced civilians were regularly taken by armed local
militia and/or communal police and subjected to sexual violence, and/or beaten on
or near the bureau communal premises. Displaced civilians were also murdered
frequently on or near the bureau communal premises. Many women were forced
to endure multiple acts of sexual violence which were at times committed by
more than one assailant. These acts of sexual violence were generally
accompanied by explicit threats of death or bodily harm. The female displaced
civilians lived in constant fear and their physical and psychological health
deteriorated as a result of the sexual violence and beatings and killings.
12B. Jean Paul Akayesu knew that the acts of sexual violence, beatings
and murders were being committed and was at times present during their
commission. Jean Paul Akayesu facilitated the commission of the sexual
violence, beatings and murders by allowing the sexual violence and beatings and
murders to occur on or near the bureau communal premises. By virtue of his
presence during the commission of the sexual violence, beatings and murders and
by failing to prevent the sexual violence, beatings and murders, Jean Paul
Akayesu encouraged these activities. 26
The Prosecution also added three additional counts, charging Akayesu with the crimes
against humanity of rape and “other inhumane acts” as well as the war crime of
committing “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular rape, degrading and
humiliating treatment and indecent assault.” 27 The genocide counts were textually
unchanged. Due to the placement of the new factual allegations immediately after
paragraph 12 as set forth above, however, the alleged acts of sexual violence were
incorporated by reference into the original genocide counts of the indictment. So, in
essence, the Prosecution also charged sexual violence as a predicate act of genocide,
although it had not expressly sought, or received, leave to do so. 28
Testimony of Sexual Violence
The trial recommenced on October 23, 1997 pursuant to the amended indictment.
Akayesu again pled not guilty. The Prosecution presented six new witnesses, five of
whom (JJ, OO, KK, NN, and PP) testified to being raped repeatedly and/or to seeing
other women and girls being raped, humiliated, or sexually abused. All testified that
26

Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Amended Indictment (June 1997).
Id.
28
According to Patricia Viseur-Sellers, it was not necessary to amend the genocide counts specifically,
because the definition of genocide, and particularly the actus reus of causing serious bodily or mental harm,
covered the new evidence of sexual violence. Adding the new allegations was sufficient to charge
genocidal rape. Viseur-Sellers Email, supra note 14.
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Akayesu was either present or nearby when the abuses occurred and that he was often
supervising, encouraging, or ordering the direct perpetrators. The harrowing testimony of
Witness JJ about the prevalence of rape in the bureau communal, as summarized by the
Trial Chamber, is emblematic of what transpired in Taba Commune on that day.
421. . . . Witness JJ testified that this happened to her—that she was
stripped of her clothing and raped in front of other people. At the request of the
Prosecutor and with great embarrassment, she explicitly specified that the rapist, a
young man armed with an axe and a long knife, penetrated her vagina with his
penis. She stated that on this occasion she was raped twice. Subsequently, she
told the Chamber, on a day when it was raining, she was taken by force from near
the bureau communal into the cultural center within the compound of the bureau
communal, in a group of approximately fifteen girls and women. In the cultural
center, according to Witness JJ, they were raped. She was raped twice by one
man. Then another man came to where she was lying and he also raped her. A
third man then raped her, she said, at which point she described herself as feeling
near dead. Witness JJ testified that she was at a later time dragged back to the
cultural center in a group of approximately ten girls and women and they were
raped. She was raped again, two times. Witness JJ testified that she could not
count the total number of times she was raped. She said, “each time you
encountered attackers they would rape you,”—in the forest, in the sorghum fields.
Witness JJ related to the Chamber the experience of finding her sister before she
died, having been raped and cut with a machete.
422. Witness JJ testified that when they arrived at the bureau communal
the women were hoping the authorities would defend them but she was surprised
to the contrary. . . . On the way to the cultural center the first time she was raped
there, Witness JJ said that she and the others were taken past the Accused and that
he was looking at them. The second time she was taken to the cultural center to
be raped, Witness JJ recalled seeing the Accused standing at the entrance of the
cultural center and hearing him say loudly to the Interahamwe, “Never ask me
again what a Tutsi woman tastes like,” and “Tomorrow they will be killed.”
According to Witness JJ, most of the girls and women were subsequently killed,
either brought to the river and killed there, after having returned to their houses,
or killed at the bureau communal. Witness JJ testified that she never saw the
Accused rape anyone, but she, like Witness H, believed that he had the means to
prevent the rapes from taking place and never even tried to do so. 29
A number of defense witnesses—many of whom were in detention in Rwanda—
testified that they did not see any rapes in the bureau communal. 30 Several also testified
that Akayesu attempted to help Tutsi individuals, by issuing laissez-passers and holding
off the Interahamwe. Defense witness Matata, called as an expert, expressed the opinion
that “rapists were more interested in satisfying their physical needs, that there were
spontaneous acts of desire even in the context of killing [and] that Tutsi women, in
general, are quite beautiful and that raping them is not necessarily intended to destroy an
29
30

Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at paras. 421-22.
Id. at paras. 439-45.
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ethnic group, but rather to have a beautiful woman.” 31 Akayesu also secured the
testimony of Major-General Roméo Dallaire, former force commander of UNAMIR, in
an effort to prove that if Dallaire could not stop the abuses, Akayesu could not have been
expected to do so.
This was Akayesu’s defense when he finally took the stand on March 12, 1998.
Akayesu tried to refashion the facts to show he was a figurehead under the control of the
Interahamwe and that he did all he could to reduce the violence in his commune. On
direct examination, Akayesu conceded that genocide occurred in Rwanda and that acts of
violence, including killings, occurred in Taba Commune. He denied, however, that any
acts of rape or other sexual violence took place in his bureau communal, while he was
present or otherwise. 32 Prosper, the lead prosecutor, did not pursue the issue on cross
examination, focusing instead on the meeting in Gishyeshye sector in which the
incitement to genocide allegedly occurred. 33 Judge Pillay raised the issue of sexual
violence, after Prosper announced he had no more questions, by asking Akayesu for his
reaction to the testimony on rape that he had heard. Akayesu again denied that he had
witnessed acts of rape in his Commune. 34 He also questioned why evidence of rape had
not been in the initial witness statements procured by the Prosecution. He suggested that
the indictment had been amended because of pressure from the women’s movement and
that the testimony was fabricated: “There have been some amicus curiae. There have
been activities. Akayesu must be accused of rape. People, women are agitated in
Rwanda. They are awakened. They are worked up to agree that they have been raped.
So there is a change in my indictment.” 35
In closing arguments, the Prosecution focused more actively on the acts of sexual
violence in the record, arguing that they constituted “serious bodily and mental harm”
and “conditions of life calculated” to destroy the group within the meaning of the
genocide definition. 36 In their closing, defense counsel attacked the testimony of various
witnesses on the ground that they lacked credibility and accuracy, arguing, for example,
that it was incredible that J—being six months pregnant—would have been able to climb
a tree. The defense also argued that the rape allegations were a reaction to “public
31

Id. at para. 442.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript (Direct Examination) (Mar. 12, 1998). In its Judgment, the
Trial Chamber noted “the Accused’s emphatic denial of facts which are not entirely within his knowledge.”
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at para. 32. One observer has noted that defendants almost always deny
responsibility for acts of sexual violence, even when they acknowledge their involvement in other crimes.
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available
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http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/analysiso
ftrends_en.php.
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Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript (Cross Examination), at pp.189-92 (Mar. 13, 1998).
34
In particular, Akayesu testified: “nobody ever reported to me that it had taken place, that we had rape in
my commune, and certainly nothing, to the best of my knowledge, was done in the bureau communal and I
never saw with my eyes anybody being raped in the bureau communal.” Id. at p. 190.
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Id. at p.192 See also Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at para. 448.
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pressure” without basis in reality and that a syndicate of informers had procured the
testimony against his client in an effort to misappropriate his property, notwithstanding
that Akayesu had been found indigent. 37 All told, the trial proceedings consumed about
sixty days—over fourteen months. The Chamber retired for their deliberations.
Genocidal Rape in Theory
Women experience armed conflict and repression in ways that are different from
men. In particular, “[w]omen are violated in ways that men are not, or rarely are.” 38
Rape and other forms of sexual violence against women have long been employed as
weapons of war and as tools to subjugate entire communities. 39 The 1863 Lieber Code,
one of the first efforts to codify the laws of war, designated rape as a war crime, 40
rejecting the customary view that the rape of women associated with the enemy was an
expected spoil, inevitable byproduct, or legitimate tactic of war. Despite this promising
beginning, many modern international humanitarian law treaties euphemistically prohibit
sexual violence as a violation of dignity or honor rather than as crime of assault against
the physical integrity of the victim. Even when positive law recognizes rape as an
international crime, prosecutions may be sparse when the commission of rape is invisible,
considered inevitable, or trivialized. For example, the World War II Nuremberg
indictment and Judgment did not mention rape, although evidence of rape was entered
into the record. The contemporaneous Tokyo Tribunal did hold Japanese officials liable
for failing to control their troops, including during the literal and metaphorical “Rape of
Nanking”; however, the proceedings were entirely silent as to the sexual slavery suffered
by the so-called “comfort women,” and victims continue to seek justice today. Modern
definitions of international crimes now routinely include rape and other forms of sexual
violence as enumerated acts. The crime of genocide, which anchored the indictment
against Akayesu, has not been amended since its inception. The definition of genocide
37

Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript, at pp. 54-55 (Mar. 26, 1998). See also Akayesu, Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T, at paras. 44-47 (ruling that such allegations should be put to particular witnesses on cross
examination rather than raised with respect to all witnesses).
38
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD
AMNESTY LECTURES 1993 83, 85 (Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
39
As Susan Brownmiller has written about rape in wartime:
Rape of a doubly dehumanized object—as woman, as enemy—carries its own terrible logic. In
one act of aggression, the collective spirit of women and of the nation is broken, leaving a
reminder long after the troops depart. And if she survives the assault, what does the victim of
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Susan Brownmiller, Making Female Bodies the Battlefield, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 37. See also
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 31–113 (1975) (discussing rape and
war).
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See Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863) (“Crimes
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does not mention sexual violence per se, but it does encompass various acts involving the
commission of serious bodily and mental harm.
The term genocide “is a modern word for an old crime.” 41 When the Allies
unveiled the Nazi concentration camps, revealing the horrific full scope of the Nazi
“Final Solution,” the world community was faced with the challenge of how to
understand and explain the enormity of the Holocaust. As an initial response, and in
reply to Winston Churchill’s portrayal of the entirety of Nazi violence as a “crime
without a name,” 42 the Polish scholar and jurist Raphaël Lemkin coined the term
“genocide” from the Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin word caedere (to kill).
For Lemkin, who had fled Poland upon the German invasion, the critical elements of
genocide were not the individual acts, though they may be crimes in themselves, but the
broader aim to destroy entire human collectivities. 43 On Lemkin’s urging, the General
Assembly eventually promulgated a multilateral treaty defining the crime of genocide
(Article II) as follows.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 44
This definition has been incorporated verbatim into the statutes of the ad hoc criminal
tribunals and the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). While there have been
some prosecutions for genocide before the ICTY, all the defendants before the ICTR
have been prosecuted with participation of one sort or another in this “crime of crimes.” 45
Akayesu was the first.
The idea that acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence could be charged as
acts of genocide—in addition to as crimes against humanity and war crimes—was first
debated in connection with the violence in the former Yugoslavia. As that war broke out,
reports by journalists and women’s groups surfaced that Bosnian Muslim, and to a lesser
extent Croat, women were being detained in a network of rape camps or were being

41

Louis René Beres, Justice and Realpolitik: International Law and the Prevention of Genocide, 33 AM. J.
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42
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forcibly impregnated by Serbian aggressors intent on propagating more Serb children. 46
Evidence emerged that Bosnian Serb soldiers had been instructed to employ rape to
demoralize the Muslim forces and maximize the shame and humiliation experienced by
the Muslim community. 47 There was also evidence that Serbian soldiers were attempting
to alter the demographic profile of the country by forcing women to carry babies born of
rape to term. The first legal cases to plead rape as genocide were a pair of Alien Tort
Statute cases brought in New York against Radovan Karadžić, the self-proclaimed
President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina), in which
both sets of plaintiffs won default judgments against the defendant. 48
The allegations of widespread sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia mobilized
the feminist community globally, but especially in the United States, to advocate for the
creation of a vigorous system of international justice to prosecute such crimes. 49
Scholars and activists conceptualized the crime of genocidal rape as a way to physically
and psychologically harm individual victims while at the same time undermining and
denigrating the group or community to which the women belonged. 50 A new concept
was needed, feminist academics and advocates argued, to counter the tendency within
international criminal law to either characterize acts of rape as isolated war crimes or to
overlook them as incidental to issues of real international concern: the perpetration of
aggressive war, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. 51
As multiple sources have now revealed, rape in Rwanda was committed on a
massive scale. Although accurate statistics are impossible to gather, 52 estimates range
46
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from 250,000 to 500,000 rapes during the period of the genocide. 53 Rape in Rwanda was
also accompanied by sexual mutilation and torture. Women and girls were often literally
raped to death by perpetrators wielding machetes, sharpened sticks, broken bottles, and
other implements. Major Brent Beardsley, the assistant to Major-General Dallaire, was
once asked before the ICTR to describe the female corpses he saw. He responded:
[W]hen they killed women it appeared that the blows that had killed them were
aimed at sexual organs, either breasts or vagina; they had been deliberately
swiped or slashed in those areas. … [G]irls as young as six, seven years of age,
their vaginas would be split and swollen from obviously multiple gang rape, and
they would have been killed in that position. 54
Other women were held as “wives” in a form of sexual slavery. Many women
were rendered infertile or HIV-positive by this sexual violence. In the former
Yugoslavia, forced impregnation was a hallmark of sexual violence and a key proof point
for rape as genocide. 55 In the Rwandan context, the emphasis on the reproductive
consequences of rape was less salient; most women were killed or left for dead after they
were raped. Many of the women who survived their rapes did end up pregnant. The lack
of available abortion in the largely Catholic country of Rwanda resulted in the births of
innumerable enfants de mauvais souvenir—“children of bad memories.” 56
The evidence presented before the ICTR revealed that Hutu Power adherents
targeted women victims on the basis of both their gender and their ethnicity. This
intersection is highlighted by the explicitly gendered hate propaganda employed by Hutu
Power adherents in the months leading up to the genocide. 57 This propaganda vilified
Tutsi women as emblematic of Tutsi hegemony and invited the abuse of Tutsi women as
a way to destroy the Tutsi community. The Ten Commandments of the Hutu, an
extremist ideological tract published in Kangura, contained four commandments
denigrating Tutsi women, one of which warned that “A Tutsi woman … works for the
interests of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who
amputated limbs. This is because these crimes inflict physical and psychological wounds, which women
can conceal to avoid further emotional anguish, ostracization, and retaliation from perpetrators who may
live nearby. [Estimates based on pregnancies] do not account for the women whose injuries prevented
them from conceiving a child, or the number of women who experienced multiple rapes and gang rapes.”).
53
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marries a Tutsi woman, befriends a Tutsi woman, or employs a Tutsi woman as a
secretary or concubine.” 58 Kangura also warned that the Tutsi “will not hesitate to
transform their sisters, wives and mothers into pistols” to conquer Rwanda. 59 In the
iconography and rhetoric of Hutu propaganda, Tutsi women were demonized as sexual
“infiltrators” intent on undermining Hutu Power. In a case against the editor-in-chief of
Kangura, the Trial Chamber noted that this saturation propaganda created a “framework”
that “made the sexual attack of Tutsi women a foreseeable consequence.” 60 This
propaganda confirms that acts of rape and other sexual violence were not a mere “side
effect” of the armed conflict between the Rwandan Army and the RPF but were instead
“an integral part of a genocidal campaign.” 61
The sudden focus on genocidal rape raised concerns among members of the
feminist legal community. Some objected to the notion that there is something more
egregious about genocidal rape than “ordinary” rape or even rape committed in wartime.
The concern was that acknowledging and penalizing rape only when it is a form of
genocide risks “rendering rape invisible once again.” 62 Some emphasized that the
fixation on the ethnic element of the crime would obscure the gendered nature of the
genocidal rape, which represents an intersection between ethnic violence and sexualized
violence. 63 Adherents of this view also sought to avoid “privileging” some victims of
rape over others by conceptualizing them as victims of genocide—the crime at the
pinnacle of international criminal law. 64
In contrast, proponents of the recognition of genocidal rape argued that viewing
sex/gender as the only vector upon which violence may be committed in an act of rape
ignores the intersectionality of women’s identities. 65 It accordingly overlooks the fact
that women may be seen, and may see themselves, more saliently as members of a
besieged ethnic group than as bearers of a particular sex/gender, especially in the context
58
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harm done to women and men”).
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For more on intersectionality, see generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
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of inter-ethnic warfare. While rape happens “on all sides” in war as in peace, genocidal
rape is more often unidirectional, committed by the aggressor group against the victim
group. This asymmetry belies laying blame solely along gender lines and thus equalizing
the responsibility of all sides to a conflict. 66 The exploitation of the intersectionality of
women’s identity in a multiethnic society thus provides a key factor differentiating
genocidal rape from “ordinary” rape in war or peace. 67 Furthermore, proponents of the
concept argued that genocidal rape is almost inevitably the result of a policy or deliberate
strategy of a perpetrator group 68 to effectuate the destruction—in whole or in part—of a
protected group through attacks on women as a vulnerable and discrete segment of a
community. A single act of rape may implicate multiple international criminal law
prohibitions, but it is this surplus of intent inherent to the crime of genocide that also
distinguishes genocidal rape from rape perpetrated as a war crime or a crime against
humanity, or rape committed as an act of gender persecution.
The notion of genocidal rape was of thus of great concern to feminist academics
and activists. It was not until Akayesu that the idea was first litigated and ultimately
grounded in the jurisprudence of international criminal law. The opinion is chilling in its
ability to demonstrate the lived experience of women during a genocide.
The Judgment: Prosecutor v. Akayesu
In its 169-page Judgment, the Tribunal found Akayesu liable for inciting,
ordering, and causing harm to Tutsi individuals seeking refuge in the bureau communal.
For this, he was convicted of murder, extermination, and torture as crimes against
humanity. Akayesu was acquitted on the war crimes counts, including the new Count 15
concerning outrages upon dignity under Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, based on
the Trial Chamber’s ruling that the Prosecutor had failed to demonstrate that the events in
Taba Commune were sufficiently connected to the armed conflict between the Rwandan
government and the RPF being fought elsewhere in the country. 69
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The debate over whether women should advance gender solidarity over nationalism with respect to the
rapes in the former Yugoslavia seriously split the feminist community in that region. See Jelena Batinic,
Feminism, Nationalism, and War: The ‘Yugoslav Case’ in Feminist Texts, 3 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 2
(2001).
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See BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA
39, 62, 75 (1996).
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MacKinnon, supra note 38, at 89 (writing of the use of rape in the former Yugoslavia, “[t]his is ethnic
rape as an official policy of war. . . . It is rape under orders. . . . It is rape as an instrument of forced exile. .
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The Prosecution had presented evidence that Akayesu wore a military jacket, carried a weapon, and
assisted the members of the military upon their arrival in Taba Commune; however, this was deemed
insufficient to trigger the applicability of the war crimes prohibitions in the ICTR Statute. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, at paras. 641-44. The Prosecution successfully appealed the legal standard employed by
the Trial Chamber when it held that the defendant must be shown to be a commander, combatant, or other
member of the armed forces; however, the Appeals Chamber left the verdict on the war crimes counts
untouched. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgement, at paras. 425-46 (June 1, 2001).
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When it turned to the allegations of Akayesu’s involvement in acts of sexual
violence in the record, the Chamber limited its inquiry to several incidents that occurred
in the bureau communal: the rape of a number of girls and women (including Witness JJ
and OO) and the forced undressing of several women, who were then forced to perform
“gymnastics” in public. The victims of several of these events did not testify at trial,
although the incidents were recounted by other eye witnesses. The Chamber disregarded
the evidence in the record concerned with sexual assaults committed outside the bureau
communal on the ground that the indictment alleged only Akayesu’s responsibility for
acts “on or near” the compound.
Through ordering, instigating or aiding and abetting these acts, Akayesu was
found guilty of the crimes against humanity of rape and “other inhumane acts.” 70 In so
holding, the Chamber, for the first time in history, defined rape and sexual violence under
international law:
The Tribunal considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central
elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of
objects and body parts. The Tribunal also notes the cultural sensitivities involved
in public discussion of intimate matters and recalls the painful reluctance and
inability of witnesses to disclose graphic anatomical details of sexual violence
they endured. . . . The Tribunal defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual
nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. The
Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any act of a sexual
nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.
Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact. . . . The
Tribunal notes in this context that coercive circumstances need not be evidenced
by a show of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of
duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion
may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military
presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal. 71
In crafting these open-textured, holistic and explicitly ungendered definitions of rape and
sexual violence, 72 the Chamber invoked the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
70

Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at paras. 696-7. Specifically, the Chamber held that Akayesu was
responsible for these acts “by allowing them to take place on or near the premises of the bureau communal
and by facilitating the commission of such sexual violence through his words of encouragement in other
acts of sexual violence which, by virtue of his authority, sent a clear signal of official tolerance for sexual
violence, without which these acts would not have taken place.” Id. at para. 694.
71
Id. at paras. 687-88.
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For a discussion of these definitions and alternative definitions employed in the international criminal
law jurisprudence, see generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on
Akayesu, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 940 (2006). Professor MacKinnon lauds the Trial Chamber for
defining rape as a crime of coercion rather than with reference to non-consent, which she argues is
inapposite in the context of war or a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population. Id. at
942. Other Trial Chambers did not adopt this approach. See generally Adrienne Kalosieh, Note, Consent
to Genocide? The ICTY’s Improper Use of the Consent Paradigm to Prosecute Genocidal Rape in Foča,
24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 121 (2003).
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Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which does not “catalogue specific
acts in its definition of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual framework of statesanctioned violence.” 73 The Chamber furthered the analogy when it noted that “[l]ike
torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation,
discrimination, punishment, and the control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape
is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when it is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.” 74
On the genocide counts, the Tribunal—after devising a flexible, subjective view
of ethnicity—had little trouble finding that Akayesu acted with genocidal intent, 75 and
that genocide had occurred in Rwanda. The Trial Chamber also explicitly recognized the
concept of genocidal rape when it ruled that the acts of rape and sexual violence in the
record could serve as the predicate acts of genocide along with the other murders and
assaults on members of the Tutsi group.
With regard, particularly, to the acts described in paragraphs 12(A) and 12(B) of
the Indictment, that is, rape and sexual violence, the Chamber wishes to
underscore the fact that in its opinion, they constitute genocide in the same way as
any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, rape and sexual
violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the
victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the worst ways of
[inflicting] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm. .
. . These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women,
their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the
process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically
contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a
whole. 76
The Tribunal concluded that even those rapes that do not result in the death of the victim
could constitute genocide where “[s]exual violence was a step in the process of
destruction of the Tutsi group—destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life
itself.” At the same time, it recognized that the goal of many acts of sexual violence was
to make Tutsi women suffer and to mutilate them even before killing them, the intent
being to destroy the Tutsi group while inflicting acute suffering on its members in the
process. 77 In this way, the Tribunal emphasized that both the mental and physical harm
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Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at para. 687.
Id.
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Id. at para. 729 (“regarding Akayesu’s acts and utterances during the period relating to the acts alleged in
the Indictment, the Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis of all evidence brought to its
attention during the trial, that on several occasions the accused made speeches calling, more or less
explicitly, for the commission of genocide.”).
76
Id. at 731.
77
Notably, unlike other depictions of genocidal rape, this account of murderous genocidal rape does not
depend upon rapes happening in a “traditional” or patriarchal cultural milieu that values women’s chastity
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associated with rape satisfied the actus reus of the crime of genocide. 78 Akayesu was
thus convicted of genocide. 79
Prior to his pre-sentencing hearing, Akayesu dismissed his trial lawyers and spoke
in his own defense. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, with multiple sentences to be
served concurrently for offences arising from the same acts. 80 After he staged an eightday hunger strike that was joined by twenty-five other defendants, the Tribunal awarded
Akayesu his choice of new counsel for his appeal—Canadians John Philpot and André
Tremblay. One argument central to Akayesu’s appeal was that he had been prejudiced by
the amendment of his indictment to include the rape charges. The Appeals Chamber—
composed of Judges Claude Jorda (France), Lal Chand Vohrah (Malaysia), Mohamed
Shahabuddeen (Guyana), Rafael Nieto-Navia (Colombia) and Fausto Pocar (Italy)—ruled
that the scope of the amendments proposed did not amount to a “new indictment” that
prejudiced Akayesu, and that he was given reasonable and adequate time to prepare his
defense. 81 His appeal rejected, Akayesu with several other defendants was transported to
Mali where he is serving his life sentence pursuant to an agreement between that country
and the Tribunal.
The Akayesu Legacy
The Judgment against Akayesu was a significant development for gender justice
and suggested an enhanced role for advocates to play in influencing the work of the ad
hoc tribunals. In the end, however, the case did not necessarily herald a sea change
within the jurisprudence of the ICTR. The case concerning abuses in the prefecture of
Cyangugu presents a telling counterpoint. No sexual violence charges were included in
the original indictments against defendants André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and
Samuel Imanishimwe—government and military officials in Cyangugu. 82 The local
Association of Widows of the Genocide of April 1994 (AVEGA) organized themselves
to help investigators find witnesses who would testify to sexual violence in the
prefecture. 83 In response, the Prosecution announced that it intended to amend the
indictment against accused Bagambiki and Imanishimwe “as soon as possible” to include
new rape charges, but took months to do so.

or fidelity. Cf. Kalosieh, supra note 72, at 132 (emphasizing the religious and cultural characteristics of
Bosnian Muslim society in describing genocidal impact of rape).
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In this way, the Tribunal’s reasoning also tracked cases before regional human rights institutions that
have found acts of rape to constitute physical and mental torture. See Raquel Martí de Mejía v. Perú, Case
10.970, Inter-Am.C.H.R., Report No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 7, at 157 (1996); Aydín v. Turkey, 25
Eur. Ct. H.R. 251 (1997).
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He was also convicted of incitement to commit genocide. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at paras.
672-75. The complicity in genocide count was dismissed on the ground that charges of committing and
being complicit in genocide were mutually exclusive. Id. at paras. 723-30, 734.
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Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentencing Hearing (Oct. 2, 1998).
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Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, at paras. 102-23.
82
Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-96-10-I, Indictment (Jan. 29, 1998); Prosecutor v. Bagambiki,
Case No. 97-36-I, Indictment (Oct. 13, 1997).
83
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES, supra note 15, at 14.
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After finally filing the motion, Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte was called before the
Trial Chamber. She subsequently withdrew the motion to amend. 84 As happened in the
Akayesu case, female witnesses began giving evidence about sexual violence they
experienced in the prefecture during the trial. Once again, as in the Akayesu case, the
Coalition moved to appear as amicus, urging the Tribunal to call upon the Prosecution to
amend the indictment to include sexual violence charges. This time, however, the
Prosecution opposed the Coalition’s motion, arguing that the choice of what charges to
bring was within prosecutorial discretion. The Chamber denied the Coalition’s motion,
siding with the Prosecution. 85 In addition, upon defense motion, the Trial Chamber
excluded evidence of uncharged crimes, such as sexual violence, fearing prejudice to the
accused. The Tribunal ultimately acquitted Ntagerura and Bagambiki for lack of
evidence; it convicted Imanishimwe. 86 The verdict was upheld on appeal. 87 Rwanda
later announced that it would try defendant Bagambiki, once the Cyangugu prefect, for
sexual violence, even though the ICTR had ruled that he was not responsible for the
prefecture massacres in which the alleged sexual violence occurred. Because no rape
charges were pursued before the ICTR, there was no double jeopardy bar. Rwanda
sought his extradition from Tanzania and eventually tried and convicted him of rape in
absentia in October 2007. Bagambiki eventually received political asylum in Belgium;
that country is considering an extradition request from Rwanda, although there is no
extradition treaty in place between the two. 88
Other cases before the ICTR have met similar fates. At one point, more than half
of the ICTR indictments included charges of rape and other sexual violence (many
involving counts added by amendment). Many cases, however, have ended in acquittal
on the rape and sexual violence counts. For example, Prosecutor v. Musema resulted in a
conviction for rape as genocide and as a crime against humanity before the same Trial
Chamber that heard the Akayesu case. 89 Musema was accused of personally raping a
Tutsi woman in May 1994. On appeal, however, new evidence emerged that
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This incident is recounted in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES, supra note 15, at 15. Del Ponte
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to her is worse than death.’”).
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controverted the testimony presented at trial. The Appeals Chamber ruled that a
miscarriage of justice had occurred and quashed the rape conviction. 90
In Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, the defendant was acquitted of rape (charged as a
crime against humanity), because two of the judges found the key witness lacked
credibility due to inconsistencies in her testimony at trial and statements to investigators.
The Trial Chamber acquitted the defendant of rapes that were proven to have occurred. 91
In a strong dissent, Judge Arlette Ramaroson (Madagascar) argued that the
inconsistencies were not due to a lack of credibility but to an incompetent investigation. 92
Later, the Prosecution missed a deadline to appeal the acquittal, and was chastised for
prosecutorial negligence by the judges.
Other acquittals for rape occurred in the cases against Niyitegeka, 93 Muvunyi, 94
and Kamuhanda 95 —primarily because the prosecutor failed to meet the required burden
of proof. The Prosecution did not appeal these acquittals. In other cases, such as with
respect to defendants Ndindabahizi, 96 Nzabirinda, 97 Serushago, 98 and Bisengimana, 99 the
Prosecution withdrew sexual violence counts. Since the establishment of the Tribunal,
only a handful of defendants had been found guilty of gender crimes, including Akayesu,
Gacumbitsi, 100 Semanza, 101 and Muhimana 102 (all charged with rape as a crime against
humanity). Only Akayesu has been convicted of genocidal rape. One is left with the
impression that the Akayesu case is a mere anomaly.
How to explain the apparent volte face within the organs of the ICTR when
confronted with crimes of gender violence? A number of potential explanations come to
mind. It is tempting to look to the composition of the bench and the presence of female
90
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Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. 98-44A-T, Judgment, at paras. 908-925 (Dec. 1, 2003).
92
Kajelijeli, Case No. 98-44A-T, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Arlette Ramaroson, at paras. 26-28, 36 (Dec.
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judges. Judge Pillay has observed that, “Who interprets the law is at least as important as
who makes the law, if not more so. . . . I cannot stress how critical I consider it to be that
women are represented and a gender perspective integrated at all levels of the
investigation, prosecution, defense, witness protection and judiciary.” 103 The Akayesu
Transcript, however, reveals that all the judges participated in the process of surfacing
indictable gender crimes, and the Cyangugu narrative reveals that placing a woman in
charge of prosecutions will not necessarily ensure that gender justice is aggressively
pursued. Alternatively, the Tribunal may simply have been exhausted with prosecutorial
mishandling of cases generally. Finally, the relentless Completion Strategy mandated by
the U.N. Security Council is no doubt weighing against the expansion of proceedings in
any fashion.
Most critics of this apparent trend against gender justice take aim at the ICTR
Office of the Prosecution, and in particular with then-Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte. 104
Advocates of gender justice have accused Del Ponte and the Office of the Prosecution in
Kigali of neglecting the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence committed in Rwanda.
After the Prosecution failed to amend the Cyangugu indictment, for example, the
Coalition sought a meeting with Del Ponte. Their concerns are memorialized in a letter
sent to the Chief Prosecutor after the meeting. The letter accuses Del Ponte of neglecting
gender justice:
[W]e believe that your four-year record as ICTR prosecutor shows no concrete
commitment to effectively developing evidence to bring such charges, despite the
longstanding and overwhelming proof of sexual violence during the 1994
Rwandan genocide. 105
The Coalition expressed similar concerns in a letter to then-Secretary General of the
United Nations, Kofi Annan, who was at the time considering Del Ponte’s renewal. 106
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Several days later, Annan announced the appointment of Hassan Bubacar Jallow
(Gambia) to replace Del Ponte 107 as Chief Prosecutor for the ICTR. Del Ponte stepped
down from her ICTY post in December 2007 and was replaced by Belgian Serge
Brammertz.
Several policies and practices of the Office of the Prosecutor are specifically
singled out for criticism. The failure of early investigations to surface allegations about
sexual violence is blamed on the fact that the majority of investigators were men, having
been drawn from national police forces, with little experience or training in taking rape
testimony from women victims and making it trial ready. Critics also point to the
original lack of expertise in gender justice in the Office of the Prosecutor; the 2000
decision to disband the sexual assault investigative team formed in 1997; 108 the lack of
coordination between the Office of the Prosecution and the Victims and Witnesses Unit
(housed in the Registry); the failure to add sexual violence counts to new indictments
despite available evidence; the pursuit of sexual violence claims with inadequate
evidence; and the failure to fully and consistently incorporate investigations about sexual
violence into the investigative or prosecutorial strategy. 109 After repeated frustrating
experiences with the Tribunal, 110 several victims’ groups in Rwanda eventually cut off all
cooperation with the Tribunal. One report indicated that the overwhelming sentiments
expressed by rape survivors in Rwanda about their experience with the ICTR were
“burning anger, deep frustration, dashed hopes, indignation and even resignation.” 111
Overall, it appears that the Office of the Prosecution proceeded without a coherent
strategy for investigating sexual violence or a theory of how sexual violence fit into the
way in which genocide was committed in Rwanda. Where rape allegations are not
central to a prosecutorial strategy, they become dispensable.
The record before other international and quasi-international tribunals in
prosecuting gender crimes is perhaps somewhat better, although none of these tribunals
has yet adjudicated charges of genocidal rape. 112 Prior to the Akayesu case, Justice
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/lettrekofi
annan_en.php.
107
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Goldstone issued from the ICTY the first international indictment focused exclusively on
sexual violence committed in the town of Foča. Defendants were convicted of rape and
sexual slavery as crimes against humanity. 113 Likewise, Prosecutor v. Furundžija
exclusively involved sexual violence claims. After an eleven day trial—the Tribunal’s
shortest—the defendant was convicted of rape as a form of torture, a conviction upheld
on appeal despite a challenge to the Judge’s impartiality. 114 The ICTY has generally
taken a conservative approach to convicting defendants of the crime of genocide. It has
ruled that the massacre at Srebrenica constituted genocide, 115 but so far has not found a
policy on the part of the Serbian political leadership to commit genocide in BosniaHerzegovina writ large. 116 Where most charges for sexual violence are brought, they are
charged as crimes against humanity or war crimes, not as genocide. Before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, the former Chief Prosecutor integrated charges of sexual violence
into virtually all indictments, although genocide is not implicated in the violence there.
In addition, he successfully charged individuals with forced marriage, which is not
specifically enumerated in the Statute of the Special Court. 117
The Coalition’s Amicus Brief recently made a cameo appearance before the
ICTY. In June 2008, the Prosecution moved to amend the indictment against cousins
Milan and Sredoje Lukić to include crimes of sexual violence—including rape,
enslavement, and torture—arising out of their establishment of a rape camp in
Višegrad. 118 In support of his motion, the Prosecutor argued the acts of sexual violence
were an intrinsic part of the crimes committed in Višegrad. Moreover, the Prosecutor
argued, it would be in the interests of justice to permit the amendments in order to allow
the witnesses, most of whom had already been disclosed, to testify fully about the harm
they suffered at the hands of the defendants and to establish the full truth of the
defendants’ crimes. The Prosecutor cited Akayesu and the Coalition’s Brief for the
authority to belatedly amend the indictment, as the deadline to amend the indictment had
passed during Del Ponte’s tenure as Chief Prosecutor. 119 The ICTY, however, declined
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the motion on the ground that the granting the motion after the Prosecutor’s unnecessary
delay would unduly prejudice the accused. 120
Although the outcomes of the cases are mixed, much of this jurisprudence served
as a foundation for the gender violence provisions in the Rome Statute creating a
permanent International Criminal Court (“ICC”). As a result of the comprehensive work
of advocates for gender justice during the multilateral drafting of the ICC Statute, that
treaty is not only characterized by gender inclusiveness in its substantive law, but also in
its structures and procedures. 121 In particular, the ICC Statute contains an expansive list
of gender crimes in the war crimes and crimes against humanity provisions. 122 Gender is
listed as a ground—like ethnicity or race—on which an individual or collective may be
persecuted. 123 With respect to the possibility of charging genocidal rape, the definition of
genocide in Article 6 mirrors that of the Genocide Convention. However, the Elements
of Crimes—drafted to assist the ICC in interpreting its substantive offenses—note that
“serious bodily or mental harm” “may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of
torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment,” 124 thus laying the
foundation for future prosecutions of genocidal rape before the ICC. In terms of
personnel, the Statute requires the State parties to choose judges and other staff with
experience with “violence against women or children” 125 and calls for “fair
representation of female and male judges.” 126 Of the eighteen ICC judges, seven are now
women. This compares favorably to other international courts, whose composition is
heavily dominated by men. 127 The ICC Statute also contains a non-discrimination
provision stating that the ICC’s application and interpretation of the law must be
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consistent with internationally recognized human rights and be without adverse
distinction founded on, inter alia, gender. 128
Many of these provisions in the Rome Statute are the result of the work of another
coalition of women’s groups, then called the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice
(“Caucus”), which was active during the drafting of the Rome Statute. 129 The Caucus
formed in 1997 to infuse a gender perspective in the negotiations surrounding the
establishment of the ICC. To achieve these provisions, the Caucus had to overcome
significant resistance from certain states and delegations to the Rome Conference—
including the Vatican, several anti-choice organizations, and a core of Islamic states—
that were less sympathetic to the concerns of gender justice. The Caucus, reorganized in
2004 as the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice, 130 is now focused on monitoring the
Court’s implementation of the gender provisions of the Rome Statute and channeling the
concerns of women in the regions in which the ICC is working. These achievements may
prove to be the most enduring legacy of the Akayesu case as the ICC begins work.
Conclusion
Every once in a while, a case comes along that, for the first time, firmly embeds
legal theory into positive law. The case against Akayesu is one such jurisprudential
pioneer. The case is also often cited as a promising example of successful feminist
advocacy. Advocacy did produce important concrete results in the Akayesu case. It
situated the concept of genocidal rape within the international criminal law framework,
despite the Prosecutor’s claim that he was not motivated by the Coalition’s work. Placed
in a larger context, the case better exemplifies the difficulty activists face in influencing
the prosecutorial and adjudicative process, where prosecutorial discretion is paramount,
and tribunals may only rule on the evidence that properly appears before them. It is
tempting to credit much of the story about the progress of gender justice before the
international tribunals to the presence of key women involved in the international
criminal law process. The stories recounted above, however, reveal that male judges and
prosecutors were at times equally as enlightened to issues of gender justice as their
female counterparts and that the presence of women in leadership roles does not always
translate into feminist policies.
Subsequent cases—at least before the ICTR—have not, by and large, built on the
Akayesu precedent. If anything, the cause of gender justice seems to have been subject to
backsliding. As the two ad hoc tribunals wind down under their Completion Strategies,
the story of Akayesu is likely to become a mere introduction to further developments in
gender justice achieved before the International Criminal Court. For now, Akayesu
stands alone in recognizing rape as a form of genocide.
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